Texas A&M University-San Antonio

Digital Commons @ Texas A&M University-San Antonio
Criminology and Criminal Justice Faculty
Publications

College of Arts and Sciences

10-2019

Construing the Legality of Solitary Confinement: Analysis of
United States Federal Court Jurisprudence
Claire Nolasco
Michael S. Vaughn

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tamusa.edu/crim_faculty
Part of the Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons

CONSTRUING THE LEGALITY OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT: ANALYSIS OF
UNITED STATES FEDERAL COURT JURISPRUDENCE
INTRODUCTION
Testifying before Congress, United States (“U.S.”) Supreme Court Justice Anthony
Kennedy warned of the ills of solitary confinement and criticized the use of “isolation cells”
(U.S. House of Representatives, 2015). Justice Kennedy also noted in a concurring opinion
(Davis v. Ayala, 2015, p. 2209) that some inmates spend decades in solitary confinement in a
“windowless cell no larger than a typical parking spot for 23 hours a day…and…when…[let out
they are]…allowed little or no opportunity for conversation or interaction with anyone.” In fact,
since 1890, the Supreme Court has known of “the human toll wrought by extended terms of
isolation.” The Court warned that isolation cells cause “a further terror and a peculiar mark of
infamy” (Davis v. Ayala, 2015, p. 2210, quoting In re Medley, 1890, p. 168), elaborating that a
“considerable number of…prisoners fell, after even a short [solitary] confinement, into a semifatuous condition…and others [become] violently insane; others, still, commit[ ] suicide” (Davis
v. Ayala, 2015, p. 2210, quoting In re Medley, 1890, p. 170; Freckelton, 2011; Rivlin, et al.,
2013).
Solitary confinement refers to the practice of correctional administrators of placing an
inmate in restricted housing or in a long-term supermax security housing (McGinnis et al., 2014,
2008b; Shames et al., 2015). Solitary confinement includes isolation through disciplinary or
punitive segregation, administrative segregation, and protective custody (Frost & Monteiro,
2016; Shames et al., 2015). Disciplinary or punitive segregation involves short term confinement
in a restrictive housing unit to sanction inmates for specific infractions. It is imposed after a
disciplinary hearing and requires due process safeguards (O'Keefe, 2008). Administrative
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segregation is used to separate inmates deemed a significant threat to institutional security. It
refers to long-term classification to the supermax unit or facility within a correctional system
(Frost & Monteiro, 2016). Protective custody refers to the practice of segregating inmates for
their own protection because they are at high risk of victimization. Inmates placed in solitary
confinement experience psychological trauma (Haney, 2003; Johnson, 2016; Shoats v. Horn,
2000; Williams v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 2017), stupor, difficulties
with thinking and concentration, obsessional thinking, agitation, irritability, and difficulty
tolerating external stimuli (Grassian, 2006, p. 331), anxiety and panic (Haney & Lynch, 1997, p.
500), depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, psychosis, hallucinations, paranoia,
claustrophobia, and suicidal ideation (Freckelton, 2011; Haney & Lynch, 1997; Kupers,
2017), physical harm, such as high rates of suicide (Hayes, 2017; Rivlin, et al., 2013) and selfmutilation (Grassian, 1983), weight loss, hypertension, heart abnormalities, and aggravation of
pre-existing medical problems (Korn, 1988; Reiter, 2016). Despite the well-researched trauma
wrought by even short periods of segregation (Haney, 2018; Smith, 2006), the U.S. correctional
system implements this practice as a primary means of disciplining inmates or maintaining
institutional peace and order (Lee & Prabhu, 2015; Obama, 2016; U.S. Department of Justice,
2016), which runs contrary to the position taken by the National Commission on Correctional
Health Care (2016).
The Bureau of Justice Statistics, for instance, reports that among a sample of 91,177 adult
inmates in 233 state and federal prisons and 357 local jails in 2011-2012, 4.4% of state and
federal inmates and 2.7% of jail inmates were confined in administrative segregation (Beck,
2015). Almost 20% of prison inmates and 18% of jail inmates were placed in restrictive housing
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(e.g., disciplinary or administrative segregation or solitary confinement) in the prior 12 months
or since coming to their current facility, while 29% of prison inmates and 22% of jail inmates
with symptoms of serious psychological distress were placed in restrictive housing in the prior
12 months (Beck, 2015). The substantial portion of inmates placed in segregation increased
inmate litigation questioning its legality under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of
the U.S. Constitution (Allen-Bell, 2012; Henderson, 2015).
The evolution of Supreme Court jurisprudence on legal standards affecting an inmate’s
liberty interest to be free from segregation can be traced back to Hewitt v. Helms (1983). Prior to
Sandin v. Conner (1995), the analysis focused on whether prison regulations contained
“mandatory” language protecting a liberty interest instead of the confinement conditions
experienced by the inmate (Beverati v. Smith, 1997, p. 503; Marcus, 2015, p. 1169). After
Sandin, the analysis revolved around whether the segregation conditions imposed “atypical and
significant hardship” on the inmate beyond the routine prison experience (Benjamin v. Fraser,
2001; Marcus, 2015). In Sandin (1995, pp. 485-487), the Court held that an inmate’s 30-days
disciplinary segregation did not implicate a liberty interest because it did not “drastically
deviate” from the basic conditions of his sentence, involve a “major disruption” of his
environment,” or “inevitably affect the duration of his sentence.” Plaintiff’s 30-day disciplinary
segregation was not excessive compared to “similar, but totally discretionary, confinement in
either duration or degree of restriction” (Sandin v. Conner, 1995, pp. 486-487).
Similar to Sandin, the Court in Wilkinson v. Austin (2005) considered the nature of the
more-restrictive confinement and its duration. In Wilkinson (2005, p. 213), however, the Court
explained that an inmate’s assignment to a maximum-security prison with “highly restrictive
3
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conditions” imposed “atypical and significant hardship” because of “significant differences”
between conditions at the maximum-security prison and “most solitary confinement facilities.”
The Court noted that the inmate’s placement in the maximum security prison was indefinite and,
after an initial 30-day review, was only reviewed annually. In addition, placement in the
maximum security prison disqualified the inmate from parole consideration (Wilkinson v. Austin,
2005).
Despite these pronouncements by the Supreme Court, lower courts have vacillated in
construing what constitutes atypical and significant hardship (Johnson, 2016; Marcus, 2015).
The Court did not define any baseline in Wilkinson v. Austin (2005) from which to compare
whether the questioned segregation imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate.
Federal courts have consequently developed varying interpretations and outcomes when faced
with inmate litigation challenging conditions of their segregation.
Objectives
This article examines precedent in the various 12 U.S. Courts of Appeals (the 11
numbered circuits and the D.C. Circuit) to determine differences and similarities among federal
circuit case law when interpreting various aspects of inmate segregation, namely: liberty
interests, atypical and significant hardships, and baselines of comparison. The article concludes
that despite the voluminous research pointing out the deleterious effects of solitary confinement
on inmates’ mental and physical health, these effects play a relatively minor role in the judicial
assessment of the constitutionality of administrative segregation and punitive isolation.
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METHOD
The WESTLAW database contains electronic copies of all published and unpublished
court decisions. A keyword search was used to gather cases on inmate segregation decided by
all 12 U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals. The advanced search parameters required that the terms
“Wilkinson v. Austin” AND “atypical and significant hardship” appeared in the “main body” of
the case and that both reported and unreported cases filed and decided after January 1, 2005 be
searched for relevant cases (N=110). The authors focused on cases citing Wilkinson v. Austin
(2005) which involved extreme conditions of administrative segregation in a supermax facility in
contrast to the more routine conditions of disciplinary segregation in Sandin v. Conner (1995).
The intent was to examine inmate litigation alleging that their conditions were sufficiently
extreme so as to trigger the standard of atypical and significant hardship. The analysis did not
include solitary confinement cases where inmates did not challenge the legality of their
confinement, such as death row inmates alleging the unconstitutionality of the death penalty or
segregated inmates alleging excessive use of force. Since the analysis specifically focused on
inmate litigation attacking the legality of their solitary confinement conditions, the search terms
were limited to the Supreme Court’s legal standard of atypical and significant hardship.
The article analyzes a population of cases and not a sample. The authors then read each
case individually and determined that not all cases were relevant to the article, either because the
case did not involve inmate segregation, only discussed atypical and significant hardship briefly,
made reference to Wilkinson v. Austin (2005) in passing, did not contain sufficient facts to enable
full analysis, or contained a decision that either affirmed or repealed a lower court’s decision,
without discussing the facts. Also, some of the cases were repeated because of the appeal
5
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process through the federal courts. The deletion process also excluded all criminal cases,
yielding a total of 68 circuit court cases. The authors conducted an inductive doctrinal analysis
(Nolasco, Vaughn, & del Carmen, 2010) to synthesize circuit court decisions on legal concepts
surrounding inmate segregation, creating a framework from which to present the analysis
(Nolasco, et al., 2015).
ANALYSIS OF CIRCUIT COURT PRECEDENT
Identification of Liberty Interests within Segregation
A long line of precedent emphasize that incarcerated persons retain only a “narrow range
of protected liberty interests” due to the “necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges
and rights” (Abbott v. McCotter, 1994, p. 1442; Hewitt v. Helms, 1983, p. 467; In re Long Term
Admin. Segregation, 1999, p. 468; Price v. Johnston, 1948, p. 285; Rezaq v. Nalley, 2012, p.
1011). To prevail on a 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim, an inmate must demonstrate that: (1) he or she
was deprived of a right guaranteed by the Constitution or federal laws; and, (2) the deprivation
occurred “under color of state law” (Bingham v. Thomas, 2011, p. 1175). A §1983 action based
on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause must allege a deprivation of a protected
liberty interest (Bass v. Perrin, 1999; Smith v. Deemer, 2016). Liberty interests are violated, for
instance, when state action alters the term of an inmate’s imprisonment (e.g., revocation of good
time credit) or imposes an atypical and significant hardship beyond the ordinary conditions of
prison life (Burnette v. Fahey, 2012; Greenholtz v. Inmates, 1979; Hewitt v. Helms, 1983;
Lovelace v. Lee, 2006; Sandin v. Conner, 1995; Smith v. Deemer, 2016; Vitek v. Jones, 1980;
Wilkerson v. Goodwin, 2014; Wilkinson v. Austin, 2005; Wolff v. McDonnell, 1974). The
requirement of procedural due process must be based on the express provisions of a state statute,
6

CONSTRUING THE LEGALITY OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT
regulation, or policy granting the inmate a protected liberty interest (Meachum v. Fano, 1976;
Prieto v. Clarke, 2015).
Appendix 1 describes how the different U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals after Wilkinson v.
Austin (2005) interpret three issues surrounding inmate segregation, focusing on the
identification of liberty interests, atypical and significant hardships, and baselines of comparison.
An inmate does not have any liberty interest in avoiding: (1) change in status or classification
“because he is not entitled to a particular degree of liberty in prison” (Keck v. Zenon, 2007, p.
818; Meachum v. Fano, 1976, p. 225; Templeman v. Gunter, 1994, p. 369); (2) disciplinary
segregation imposed as a sanction after a due process hearing (Hallman v. Cate, 2012; Keck v.
Zenon, 2007; Rodriguez v. Pearson, 2012) or pending investigation for another inmate’s death
(Skinner v. Cunningham, 2005), unless it “inevitably” lengthens a prisoner’s sentence (Carson v.
Johnson, 1997, p. 821); and, (3) administrative segregation based on a legitimate penological
interest (McKeithan v. Beard, 2009; Orellana v. Kyle, 1995).
The First Circuit considered the duration and exigency of the punitive segregation when
it upheld the 40-day segregation of an inmate without a hearing “for his own sake and for the
protection of others—while investigating the circumstances” (Skinner v. Cunningham, 2005, p.
486; Cf. Reardon v. United States, 1991, p. 1522). The Second Circuit considers both the
duration and conditions of an inmate’s segregation (Palmer v. Richards, 2004; Tellier v. Fields,
2000). The Second Circuit found that an inmate had a liberty interest in avoiding administrative
segregations lasting 180 (Kalwasinski v. Morse, 1999) and 305 days (Colon v. Howard, 2000).
Confinements “of an intermediate duration—between 101 and 305 days” require detailed
scrutiny of whether the inmate experienced atypical and significant hardship, but segregations
7
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longer than 305 days definitely trigger a liberty interest, which require due process protections
(Colon v. Howard, 2000, p. 232).
The Third Circuit also considers both the length of segregation and conditions of
confinement to determine whether the inmate was deprived of his liberty interests (Burns v. Pa.
Dep’t. of Corr., 2001). In Diaz v. Canino (2012), inmate Diaz was placed in disciplinary
segregation because prison officials received information that he was planning to escape. After a
misconduct hearing, he was found guilty and sentenced to 360-days in disciplinary confinement.
While in disciplinary confinement, Diaz was subjected to “continuous searches,” “regular
relocation of his cell,” and “was unable to sleep” because his cell lights “remained turned on” (p.
216). The Third Circuit held that: (1) the conditions and the length of Diaz’s segregation did not
impose atypical and significant hardship; and, (2) Diaz did not provide any baseline of
comparison since he did not specify the conditions experienced by other inmates who were not in
disciplinary segregation.
Fourth Circuit precedent hold that a death row inmate does not have any protected liberty
interest in avoiding isolation on death row (Prieto v. Clarke, 2015). Prieto involved an inmate
who was confined to death row pursuant to Virginia state policy. Under the policy, death row
inmates cannot be placed in any alternative confinement, live in isolated cells, and have more
onerous and restrictive visitation and recreation privileges compared to general population
inmates.
The Fifth Circuit denied the existence of a protected liberty interest in the following
cases: (1) 14-days of disciplinary segregation of a federal inmate, resulting in a three-month loss
of commissary, visitation, and telephone privileges (Watkins v. Lnu, 2013); (2) administrative
8
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segregation without “extraordinary circumstances” (Cruz v. Forrest, 2009, p. 901; Hernandez v.
Velasquez, 2008, pp. 562-564; Huff v. Thaler, 2013, p. 311; Jimenez v. McQueen, 2012; Luken v.
Scott, 1995, p. 193; Pichardo v. Kinker, 1996, pp. 612-613; Wilkerson v. Goodwin, 2014, p.
853); and, (3) an inmate’s custodial classification (Hernandez v. Velasquez, 2008; Moody v.
Baker, 1988; Rollins v. Cain, 2011), unless the inmate experienced atypical and significant
hardship (Bailey v. Fisher, 2016). The Fifth Circuit cautioned that prison officials should be
granted “the widest possible deference” in classifying prisoners’ custodial status when necessary
“to maintain security and preserve internal order” (Hernandez v. Velasquez, 2008, p. 562;
McCord v. Maggio, 1991; Pichardo v. Kinker, 1996, pp. 612-613). Thus, inmates have few
liberty interests when balanced against the prison officials’ custodial and security interests.
In Hernandez v. Velasquez (2008), an inmate serving a life sentence for capital murder
was placed on lockdown status after he was suspected of being a gang member and was planning
a riot with a rival prison gang. While on lockdown for approximately one year, he was confined
to a two-person cell measuring five-feet by nine-feet and was allowed to leave his cell only for
showers, medical appointments, and family visits. The Fifth Circuit held that an inmate
maintains a due process challenge to his custodial classification only when he or she
“demonstrates extraordinary circumstances” (p. 562). The lockdown conditions in Hernandez,
however, did not impose an atypical or significant hardship because they were “comparable to, if
not less severe than, those found unactionable in other cases” (p. 563). Temporary lockdown to
prevent gang violence was a normal condition of confinement that an inmate could expect while
in prison (Hernandez v. Velasquez, 2008; Wagner v. Hanks, 1997).
According to the Sixth Circuit, an inmate does not possess any liberty interest in avoiding
9
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61-days of administrative segregation (Jones v. Baker, 1998; Joseph v. Curtin, 2010; RimmerBey v. Brown, 1995), transfer to a higher security level facility (Joseph v. Curtin, 2010), or
transfer from one state correctional institution to another that is not a supermax facility (Bell v.
Wilkinson, 2005) unless the conditions imposed atypical and significant hardship. An initial
placement in administrative segregation or an increase in security classification does not
constitute an atypical and significant hardship because a prisoner “has no constitutional right to
remain incarcerated in a particular prison or to be held in a specific security classification”
(Harbin–Bey v. Rutter, 2005, p. 577; Harden–Bey v. Rutter, 2008, pp. 794-795).
Under Seventh Circuit precedent, substantial lengths or unusually harsh conditions in
segregation may trigger a liberty interest (Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 2009; Means v.
Larson, 2014; Townsend v. Cooper, 2014). Short periods of segregation for 10-days (Smith v.
Birkey, 2011), one-month (Means v. Larson, 2014), or 78-days (Obriecht v. Raemisch, 2014),
transfers to discretionary nonpunitive administrative segregation pending investigation
(Townsend v. Fuchs, 2008), or transfers to less restrictive segregation (Furrow v. Marberry,
2011; Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 2006) do not implicate a liberty interest (Toston v. Thurmer,
2012; Earl v. Racine Cnty. Jail, 2013; Lekas v. Briley, 2005; Orr v. Larkins, 2010; Richardson v.
Runnels, 2010).
According to the Eighth Circuit, an inmate does not enjoy any “constitutional right to
remain in a particular institution” (Goff v. Burton, 1993, p. 737; Murphy v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr.,
2004, p. 503). Prison administrators may transfer a prisoner “for whatever reason or for no
reason at all” (Olim v. Wakinekona, 1983, p. 250). In Saylor v. Nebraska (2016), for example, an
inmate who was sexually assaulted by other inmates was transferred to protective custody status
10
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at another correctional facility that could provide him proper medical treatment and counseling.
The Eighth Circuit held that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause does not protect an
inmate against transfer from one institution to a “comparable prison” for the “sole purpose” of
“continuing his psychiatric care” (Saylor v. Nebraska, 2016, p. 647).
In Estate of DiMarco v. Wyoming Department of Corrections (2007), the Tenth Circuit
held that the plaintiff did not have a liberty interest in avoiding protective custody. Here, a
routine physical examination of an inmate transferred to the women’s state prison revealed that
she was anatomically male. Although prison officials determined that she was a low security risk
during initial placement, they recommended segregation for safety reasons, her “physical
condition” as a hermaphrodite, and the “need to tailor programs” for her (p. 1337). After initial
placement, her status was reviewed every 90-days and she was furnished written copies of the
decision after each periodic review. While in protective confinement, the plaintiff had access to
almost all amenities provided to general population inmates, such as psychiatric and counseling
sessions, adequate clothing, the same food as general population inmates, access to prison staff
and medical care, regular reading materials, and various other personal hygiene items. The Tenth
Circuit explained that plaintiff was placed in segregation for safety reasons because other
inmates in general population who were sexual assault victims may be fearful of her or may
threaten her for other reasons. Conditions of her confinement were not extreme and, although
“Spartan,” were not atypical of protective custody (p. 1343). The court concluded that
administrative segregation did not extend the duration of her sentence—she was released after
serving 14 months.
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Determining “Atypical and Significant Hardship”
Since courts consider the severity and duration of the restrictive conditions to determine
atypical and significant hardship (Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 2013; Harden–Bey v. Rutter, 2008;
Palmer v. Richards, 2004; Serrano v. Francis, 2003; Shoats v. Horn, 2000; Wilkerson v.
Goodwin, 2014), inmates successfully claim a protected liberty interest if they present evidence
on the confinement conditions in administrative segregation (Bailey v. Fisher, 2016; Evans v.
Vinson, 2011). Some circuit courts aggregate the time spent at different facilities to determine
whether its duration imposed atypical and significant hardship. In Giano v. Selsky (2001, p. 226),
the Second Circuit aggregated the inmate’s administrative segregation at two different facilities
because “the two periods of confinement were based on the same administrative rationale” and
conditions of confinement were “identical at both facilities.” The Third Circuit aggregated the
plaintiff’s cumulative eight-year period of administrative custody in multiple state and federal
institutions (Shoats v. Horn, 2000), while the Fifth Circuit aggregated time spent in different
facilities under the same prison system to determine the total duration of segregation (Wilkerson
v. Goodwin, 2014). The Fifth Circuit suggested that “two-and-a-half years” (30 months) of
administrative segregation is a “threshold of sorts for atypicality,” so that “18-19 months of
segregation under even the most isolated of conditions” may not implicate a liberty interest while
a 40-year lockdown of inmate is unconstitutional (Bailey v. Fisher, 2016, p. 476; Wilkerson v.
Goodwin, 2014, p. 855). The Sixth Circuit held that the duration of administrative segregation
imposed atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in the following cases: (1) 8-years of
administrative segregation (Harris v. Caruso, 2012); (2) indefinite placement in administrative
segregation (Harden-Bey v. Rutter, 2008; Hatch v. District of Columbia, 1999; Iqbal v. Hasty,
12
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2007; Perkins v. Kansas Dep’t. of Corr., 1999; Serrano v. Francis, 2003; Shoats v. Horn, 2000;
Skinner v. Cunningham, 2005; Stephens v. Cottey, 2005); and (3) inmate’s segregation continued
indefinitely and affected his eligibility for parole (Heard v. Caruso, 2009).
The Seventh Circuit examines the “combined import” of the duration and conditions of
segregation (Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 2013, p. 743; Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 2009, p.
697). Relatively short periods of segregation such as 59-days (Townsend v. Fuchs, 2008) or sixmonths (Whitford v. Boglino, 1995) without “exceptionally harsh conditions” do not give rise to
a liberty interest, unless segregation “significantly altered” the conditions of the inmate’s
sentence (Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 2013, p. 744; Whitford v. Boglino, 1995, p. 533). Inmates,
however, have a liberty interest in avoiding lengthy or extreme terms of segregation (Bryan v.
Duckworth, 1996; Holly v. Woolfolk, 2005; Hoskins v. Lenear, 2005; Marion v. Columbia Corr.
Inst., 2009; Townsend v. Fuchs, 2008; Whitford v. Boglino, 1995). If the conditions of
segregation were “significantly harsher” than those in the normal prison environment, then longterm confinement, such as “a year of segregation” may implicate liberty interests, “where a few
days or weeks might not” (Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 2013, p. 743; Marion v. Columbia Corr.
Inst., 2009, pp. 697-698). Under Seventh Circuit precedent, “even extremely harsh” prison
conditions by themselves may “not be so atypical” as to create a protected liberty interest
(Townsend v. Fuchs, 2008, p. 769). Discretionary segregation imposed for “administrative,
protective, or investigative purposes” is an “ordinary incident of prison life” that inmates “should
expect to experience” while incarcerated (Lekas v. Briley, 2005, p. 611; Meriwether v. Faulkner,
1987, p. 414; Wagner v. Hanks, 1997, pp. 1175-1176).
The Ninth Circuit adopts a context-dependent, “fact-by-fact consideration” (Ramirez v.
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Galaza, 2003, p. 861) that focuses on the conditions of confinement (Chappell v. Mandeville,
2013; Duffy v. Riveland, 1996; McQuillion v. Duncan, 2002; Mitchell v. Dupnik, 1996; Mujahid
v. Meyer, 1995; Myron v. Terhune, 2007). The court considers three factors: (1) whether the
conditions “mirrored” those in “analogous discretionary confinement settings” (e.g.,
administrative segregation and protective custody); (2) the “duration and intensity” of the
conditions; and (3) whether the change in confinement would “inevitably affect” the duration of
the inmate’s sentence (Chappell v. Mandeville, 2013, pp. 1064-1065; Ramirez v. Galaza, 2003,
p. 861).
The Tenth Circuit examines “several nondispositive factors” to determine whether
segregation imposes atypical and significant hardship on the routine aspects of prison life: (1) the
segregation “relates to and furthers a legitimate penological interest;” (2) the confinement
conditions are “extreme” (Fogle v. Pierson, 2006, p. 1265); (3) the segregation “increases the
duration of confinement;” and (4) the segregation is “indeterminate” (Abbott v. McCotter, 1994,
p. 1442; Deberry v. Davis, 2012, p. 801; Estate of DiMarco v. Wyoming Department of
Corrections, 2007, p.1342; McAdams v. Wyoming Department of Corrections, 2014, p. 721;
Rezaq v. Nalley, 2012, pp. 1011-1012; Stallings v. Werholtz, 2012, p. 844; Suarez v. Palomino,
2014, p. 735).
The Tenth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of administrative segregation in the
following cases: (1) confinement of a former defense contractors under special administrative
measures at the federal prison’s Administrative Maximum Facility (“ADX”) in Florence,
Colorado after conviction for federal conspiracy to export classified defense information and
divulging national security secrets (Gowadia v. Stearns, 2014); (2) long-term segregation for
14
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potentially violent inmates, including plaintiff’s more than 400-days segregation in maximum
security due to “verbal and written threats to kill prison employees who laid hands on him”
(Marshall v. Ormand, 2014, pp. 661-662); (3) long-term administrative segregation of an inmate
pending an assault investigation for safety reasons and because of prior disciplinary history of
serious infractions, including gang membership and assault of other inmates (Jordan v. FBOP,
2006; McAdams v. Wyoming Department of Corrections, 2014); and, (4) transfer of inmates
convicted of terrorism-related offenses to ADX in Florence, CO (Rezaq v. Nalley, 2012) due to
national security concerns after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (U.S. v. Rahman, 1999;
U.S. v. Rezaq, 1998).
The Tenth Circuit observed that ADX conditions: (1) are not “extreme” although more
restrictive than other segregation units —plaintiffs had “control over the lights in their cells,”
access to outdoor recreation, maintained contact and communication with staff and other
inmates, and were allowed five “no contact social visits” and “two 15-minute phone calls per
month” (Rezaq v. Nalley, 2012, p. 1014); (2) are “substantially similar to” conditions “routinely
imposed” in “any solitary confinement setting” (Rezaq v. Nalley, 2012, p. 1015); and (3) did not
increase the duration of their sentences and was not indeterminate because of the availability of
periodic reviews (Shoats v. Horn, 2000, p. 144; Trujillo v. Williams, 2006, p. 1225).
The Eleventh Circuit held that an inmate does not have any liberty interest in avoiding
15-days of disciplinary segregation that does not result in loss of any good-time credit and where
conditions of confinement (e.g., lack of writing surface, lock for storage bin, and a television) do
not represent such “dramatic departure” from ordinary prison life (Smith v. Deemer, 2016, p.
868). Atypical and significant hardship must exist for a “significant period of time” and must be
15

CONSTRUING THE LEGALITY OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT
“severe relative to regular prison” (Smith v. Deemer, 2016, p. 868). Administrative confinement
for 30-days (Sandin v. Conner, 1995) or 60-days (Rodgers v. Singletary, 1998) does not impose
atypical and significant hardship, but segregation for 500-days (Magluta v. Samples, 2004) or
one-year (Williams v. Fountain, 1996) constitutes atypical and significant hardship.
Assessing Baselines of Comparison
The Supreme Court declined to define the baseline from which to compare what is
“atypical and significant hardship” (Sandin v. Conner, 1995; Wilkinson v. Austin, 2005).
Appendix 1 describes the different baselines of comparison used by the different U.S. Circuit
Courts of Appeals including: (1) general population conditions at the same institution (Beverati
v. Smith, 1997; Hill v. Fleming, 2006; Keenan v. Hall, 1996; Penrod v. Zavaras,1996; Williams
v. Lindamood, 2013, p. 561); (2) other types of administrative segregation, including protective
custody, in the particular state’s penal system (Gaines v. Stenseng, 2002; Griffin v. Vaughn,
1997; Jones v. Baker, 1998; Wagner v. Hanks, 1997, pp. 1175-1176); (3) conditions experienced
by “other inmates in the same segregation” unit (Gaines v. Stenseng, 2002, pp. 1225-1226; Hill
v. Fleming, 2006, p. 666); (4) experiences of other “uniquely placed or difficult to place
prisoners” (e.g., physically or mentally ill or dependent inmates, elderly inmates, or inmates with
disabilities) (Estate of DiMarco v. Wyoming Department of Corrections, 2007, pp. 1341-1342);
and, (5) “the most restrictive confinement conditions routinely imposed on inmates serving
similar sentences” (Hatch v. District of Columbia, 1999, pp. 847, 856); or, at the “harshest
facility in the state’s most restrictive prison” (Aref v. Lynch, 2016, p. 254; Wagner v. Hanks,
1997, p. 1175).
The Second Circuit conducts “a fact-specific determination,” comparing the duration and
16
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conditions of plaintiff’s segregation with those in similar administrative confinement and the
general population (Aref v. Lynch, 2016, p. 254; Arce v. Walker, 1998, p. 336; Brooks v. DiFasi,
1997, pp. 48-49). The Third and Tenth Circuits generally use other forms of administrative
segregation in the same prison as the baseline of comparison (Allah v. Bartkowski, 2014;
Fantone v. Latini, 2015; Gaines v. Stenseng, 2002; Griffin v. Vaughn, 1997; Jones v. Baker,
1998). Both the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits require the plaintiff to present evidence on the
“precise conditions of ordinary prison life prior to placement” (Williams v. Lindamood, 2013, p.
561) and that the segregation involved a “major disruption to his environment” compared to
“placement in the general population” (Smith v. Regional Director of Florida, 2010, p. 13). The
Tenth Circuit acknowledged that its “own opinions” have “inconsistently used comparisons
either with inmates in the same segregation or those in the general prison population” (Ajaj v.
U.S., 2008, p. 585; Jordan v. FBOP, 2006, p. 650).
In Allah v. Bartkowski (2014, p. 137), Allah was transferred to Management Control Unit
Detention (“MCU”), a “close-custody” solitary confinement unit where he was: (1) isolated in a
small cell in a block that contained mentally ill inmates; (2) restricted to 10-minute showers daily
and a 90-minute yard period every second or third day; and, (3) not permitted access to toilets
during the 90-minute yard period, causing him to sometimes relieve himself while in the yard.
The Third Circuit concluded that the duration and conditions of Allah’s confinement implicate a
liberty interest because plaintiff was confined in the MCU for six-years and conditions in the
MCU were significantly more restrictive than conditions in administrative segregation in the
same prison (Allah v. Bartkowski, 2014; Jago v. Van Curen, 1981; Shoats v. Horn, 2000).
In a later case involving inmates who were kept on death row for several years after their
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death sentences were vacated, the Third Circuit used the general population conditions as a
baseline for comparison (Williams v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 2017).
Here, two inmates remained several years on death row after their death sentences were vacated.
One inmate spent approximately 20-years on death row, eight of which were spent after he was
granted a resentencing hearing. Another inmate spent 22-years on death row, six of which were
spent after he was granted a resentencing hearing. While on death row, plaintiffs were confined
in a windowless seven by 12-feet cell for almost 24-hours daily, deprived of communication with
the general population, and allowed four non-legal visits per month, during which they were
locked in a “closet-sized room” behind a “reinforced sheet of glass” and not permitted physical
contact with visitors (p. 554). The Third Circuit held that the plaintiffs demonstrated atypical and
significant hardship. Their continued placements on death row were indefinite, lasting for years
without any specific date for their transfer to general population. The court observed that other
forms of segregation, such as punitive segregation are often “predetermined and fixed,” unless
the inmate’s behavior requires additional periods of segregation (p. 562). The court also noted
that conditions on death row different “significantly” from “routine prison conditions” in the
state’s correctional institutions (p. 563). Inmates in general population have access to: open air
activities without strip searches, windows, natural light, daily showers, more frequent visits
where contact is allowed, group religious services, jobs and vocational programs (e.g., clothing
factory jobs, culinary training, and barbershop training), group sport activities, and unlimited
phone calls as long as they could afford them.
The Fourth Circuit reiterated that there is no single standard for determining the baseline
of comparison (Beverati v. Smith, 1997; Incumaa v. Stirling, 2015; Prieto v. Clarke, 2015;
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Ramirez v. Galaza, 2003). The atypicality baseline should be determined “in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life” since confinement conditions will vary “depending on a
particular inmate’s conviction” (Lovelace v. Lee, 2006, p. 202). A fact specific “case-by-case”
approach should consider conditions routinely imposed on “inmates serving comparable
sentences” (Prieto v. Clarke, 2015, p. 254; Rezaq v. Nalley, 2012, p. 1012). The Fourth Circuit
used the general population as a baseline for atypicality in Beverati v. Smith (1997) because state
prison regulations granted inmates in administrative segregation almost the same privileges of
general population inmates, including at least “one-hour of recreation outside their cells sevendays per week” and “substantially the same access to prison services and educational
programming” (pp. 503-504). In the subsequent case of Prieto v. Clarke (2015, p. 253), however,
the Fourth Circuit cautioned that the “baseline for atypicality” is not always the general prison
population but may vary depending on the “prisoner’s conviction and sentence.” The Fourth
Circuit affirmed that the general population is the baseline for atypicality for inmates sentenced
to confinement in the general prison population but later transferred to security detention
(Incumaa v. Stirling, 2015, p. 527).
In Incumaa v. Stirling (2015), an inmate who was a member of the Islamic extremist
group Nation of Gods and Earths (the “Five Percenters”) participated in a 1995 riot with other
Five Percenters in a prison operated by the South Carolina Department of Corrections (the
“Department”). Following this riot, the Five Percenters were designated as a Security Threat
Group. Plaintiff was then transferred from general population to the Maximum Security Unit, the
most restrictive security detention in prison. He was later transferred to the Special Management
Unit (“SMU”), a less restrictive detention. The Fourth Circuit held that plaintiff’s 20-year period
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of segregation imposed atypical and significant hardship, using the general population as a
baseline for comparison (Burnette v. Fahey, 2012; Incumaa v. Stirling, 2015). The Fourth Circuit
found that plaintiff’s confinement conditions were severely restrictive compared to general
population conditions. He was subjected to daily cavity and strip searches, confined to a small
cell, with only 10-hours of activity outside the cell per month, prohibited from socializing with
other inmates, and denied educational, vocational, and therapy programs. Also, his confinement
to the SMU is “extraordinary in its duration and indefiniteness” (Incumaa v. Stirling, 2015, p.
531).
In Wilkerson v. Goodwin (2014, p. 855), the Fifth Circuit considered the duration of
solitary confinement, the severity of the restrictions, and its “effectively indefinite nature,”
concluding that plaintiff inmate’s segregation imposed an “atypical and significant hardship”
under “any possible baseline.” The Fifth Circuit pointed out that the inmate’s 39-year
segregation was “almost five times the duration deemed sufficient to give rise to a liberty interest
in Shoats v. Horn (2000). The Fifth Circuit clarified that short periods in segregation that do not
give rise to a liberty interest range from 12-months (Hernandez v. Velasquez, 2008), 15-months
(Griffin v. Vaughn, 1997), and two-and-one-half years (Jones v. Baker, 1998).
The Fifth Circuit compared conditions of plaintiff’s 39-years of administrative
segregation to conditions of general population inmates, conditions in segregated confinement
within the Louisiana system as a whole, and conditions of other inmates serving life sentences
(Wilkerson v. Goodwin, 2014). The court noted that plaintif was: (1) confined alone to his cell
for 23-hours per day with one-hour allotted for exercise and shower; (2) denied religious or
educational opportunities, and (3) denied other privileges available to inmates in the general
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population. His segregation was also indefinite and static because the reviewing board routinely
repeated the initial reason for placement in lockdown as the same reason for continued
confinement. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff’s approximately 40-year segregation
is “so atypical” that no other inmate in Louisiana has been confined for the same period (p. 856).
The Ninth Circuit declined to identify an appropriate baseline of comparison in Brown v.
Oregon Dept. of Corrections (2014, p. 984) because “under any plausible baseline,” plaintiff’s
27-month administrative segregation in the Intensive Management Unit (“IMU”) without
meaningful review imposed on him atypical and significant hardship. The Brown case involved a
state inmate who was assigned to the IMU for 27-months after being found in possession of a
weapon. IMU inmates are confined in single-man cells for more than 23-hours per day, spend
only 40-minutes daily outside their cells, allowed two non-contact visits per month and a
maximum of two visitors in a six-month period, and denied access to privileges granted to
general population inmates (e.g., prison and law libraries, group religious services, educational
and vocational opportunities, telephone use except in emergencies, televisions, and personal
property). The Ninth Circuit observed that the plaintiff was isolated almost 23-hours each day
and denied most privileges granted to general population inmates. His IMU confinement was
fixed and irreducible, lasting for 27-months compared to the limited period of confinement and
periodic reviews given to inmates in other segregated-housing units. The Ninth Circuit observed
that the inmate did not receive any meaningful review during his 27-month segregation in IMU.
The Ninth Circuit, however, affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the defendants based
on qualified immunity because prior to this case, the court had not resolved the issue of “whether
the absence of post-placement periodic, meaningful review” implicates a protected liberty
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interest (Brown v. Oregon Dept. of Corrections, 2014, p. 988; Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 1982, p.
818; Hope v. Pelzer, 2002, p. 741; Pearson v. Callahan, 2009, p. 244; Porter v. Bowen, 2007,
pp. 1026-1027; Schwenk v. Hartford, 2000, pp. 1195-1196; U.S. v. King, 2012, p. 1189). It
would grant such a liberty interest, moving forward in future cases.
The Tenth Circuit declined to make a “rigid either/or assessment” of any baseline, instead
opting to “outline four potentially relevant, nondispositive factors,” including whether: (1) the
segregation relates to and furthers a “legitimate penological interest, such as safety or
rehabilitation”; (2) the placement conditions are “extreme”; (3) the placement “increases the
duration of confinement”; and, (4) the placement is “indeterminate” (Estate of DiMarco v.
Wyoming Department of Corrections, 2007, p. 1342; Rezaq v. Nalley, 2012, p. 1012). The proper
baseline approach for the Tenth Circuit is a “fact-driven assessment” that considers the “totality
of conditions presented by a given inmate’s sentence and confinement” (Rezaq v. Nalley, 2012).
The Tenth Circuit considered both the general prison population and inmates in the same
segregation unit as the baseline for comparison in Jordan v. FBOP (2006). In Jordan, a state
inmate who was transferred to administrative detention pending investigation of a fellow
inmate’s murder received written notice explaining the reasons for his segregation. The Tenth
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants because plaintiff
did not show that his administrative detention imposed “atypical and significant hardship”
compared to “either the general population or those in the same administrative detention” (p.
652). While in segregation, he also received the same privileges as inmates in general population
(except for group recreation). He experienced restrictions and conditions comparable to those of
the general inmate population, except for one less social call per month and seven-hours a week
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less recreation time.
The Eleventh Circuit arrived at a similar decision in Turner v. Warden (2016), where an
inmate was placed in the special management unit (“SMU”) of the Georgia State Prison. The
SMU houses high-risk inmates with a history of disciplinary problems; it consists of six wings
identified according to inmate restrictions from highest restriction to lowest restriction. The
Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff did not have any protected liberty interest in avoiding
segregation in SMU because SMU conditions were similar to those in the general population,
other types of administrative segregation, and protective custody (Delgiudice, Jr. v. Primus,
2017). Plaintiff received regular meals, five-hours of weekly outdoor recreation, and a shower
period three-times weekly. Unless he was in the most restrictive wing, he was allowed to keep
personal property, have a television in his cell, experience human contact, and receive visitors on
weekends.
The D.C. Circuit adopted a “multi-factor approach” for determining the appropriate
baseline of comparison in Hatch v. District of Columbia (1999, pp. 856-858). The court said that
a liberty interest arises only when the deprivation imposes an atypical and significant hardship
“in relation to the most restrictive confinement conditions that prison officials ... routinely
impose on inmates serving similar sentences” (pp. 856). The court used administrative
segregation, the “most routinely imposed” disciplinary measure of isolation, as a baseline of
comparison (p. 856). It scrutinized both the nature and length of the deprivation to determine
atypicality of hardship. The court in Hatch court remanded the case for the district court to
determine whether conditions of the inmate’s 29-week segregation was comparable to normal
conditions of administrative segregation and whether its duration was “atypical” compared to the
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“length of administrative segregation routinely imposed on similarly situated prisoners” (Aref v.
Lynch, 2016, p. 254).
In Aref v. Lynch (2016, p. 257), the D.C. Circuit concluded that confinement in the
FBPO Communication Management Units (“CMU”) involved “significantly less deprivation
than administrative segregation.” This case involved several inmates who were convicted of
terrorism-related activities and transferred to the two CMUs in Indiana and Illinois. The CMUs
were established in response to a perceived “deficiency” in the monitoring of inmate
communications that “allowed several inmates with terrorism-related convictions to
communicate with extremist groups outside the prisons” (p. 246). The D.C. Circuit compared the
conditions of inmates in administrative segregation with the conditions of inmates confined in
the CMUs. The court noted that inmates in administrative segregation remain in their cells for
23-hours a day, cannot work or access educational opportunities, have limited possessions of
materials, can exercise only one-hour daily for five-days a week, are allowed only one 15-minute
phone call per month, and are permitted to have four-hours of non-contact visits per month.
CMU inmates can access common spaces for 16-hours a day, have access to educational and
professional opportunities, can possess property, have no exercise restrictions, can make two 15minute calls per week, and are allowed two four-hour non-contact visits per month. The court
nonetheless acknowledged that CMU confinement is indefinite and atypical because “only a
handful are placed under these restrictions” (p. 257). The court found a liberty interest in CMU
designation because it “seems analogous to a classification,” is exercised “selectively,” and its
duration “is indefinite and could be permanent” (p. 257). Although the deprivations are not
extreme, they “necessarily increase in severity over time”—communication restrictions in
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administrative segregation last only during the period of segregation while restrictions in CMU
may last indefinitely (p. 257). Having found a protected liberty interest, the court remanded the
case for the district court to determine what type of due process is required.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This article shows that the 12 U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals have varying interpretations
of the legal standards for determining the constitutionality of inmate segregation. They diverge
on whether duration, confinement conditions, or a combination of both implicate liberty interests
requiring due process protections, which segregation conditions impose atypical and significant
hardship, and the baselines of comparison from which to determine atypicality of hardship. The
lack of uniformity across the Circuits mean that inmates in some areas of the country are subject
to longer terms of segregation and harsher conditions of confinement when compared to inmates
in other areas. Moreover, the case law reported in this article shows that even when inmates
prevail in their litigation, entitling them to due process protections, they may already have served
months, years, and, in some cases, decades in solitary isolation cells (Campbell, 2016).
The U.S. Supreme Court’s lack of guidance has helped to foster these divergent opinions
in the lower courts, and in the absence of more definitive guidelines, lower courts will continue
to differ in both their interpretations and outcomes of inmate segregation litigation. These
conflicts among the Circuits invite the Supreme Court to further clarify what the Constitution
requires of prison officials when segregating inmates. Analyzing these segregation cases also
exposes a disconnect between the law and scholarly research—while the law permits segregation
of inmates for months and years, there is an overwhelming scholarly consensus that long-term
isolation irreparably harm inmates (Henderson, 2015), promotes post-traumatic stress disorder
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(Hagan et al., 2017), increases suicidal ideation (Hayes, 2017), and makes mentally ill inmates
much worse (Haney & Lynch, 1997).
The Supreme Court created the legal construct of atypical and significant hardship to
determine the legality of solitary confinement in the cases of Sandin v Conner (1995) and
Wilkinson v. Austin (2005). Various federal courts are required to apply and interpret this legal
construct when deciding inmate litigation challenging their conditions of segregation. As an
abstract concept, it is susceptible to different interpretations and a federal court has the option to
possibly assess various mental and physical symptoms when determining atypicality and
significance of hardship. However, courts do not interpret the construct to include the negative
consequences on the mental and physical health of inmates. Instead, courts examine the duration
and severity of the segregation conditions compared to different baselines. A more scientifically
grounded interpretation would require courts to include an assessment of the harmful effects of
solitary confinement, an approach that is not foreclosed by the legal standard of atypical and
significant hardship.
Why does the law give short shrift to the harmful effects of long-term
isolation/administrative segregation on inmates? Based on separation of powers, federalism, and
remnants of the “hands-off” doctrine, the Supreme Court (Turner v. Safley, 1987, p. 89) and
lower federal courts (Oliver v. Scott, 2002, p. 745) have given state prison officials much
discretion in how they operate prison facilities. Judicial deference to prison administrators leads
the legal analysis of the constitutionality of segregation to focus on the technocratic vicissitudes
of the law, not on the harmful physical and mental outcomes wrought onto inmates. When
assessing the constitutionality of segregation, courts need to focus more on the length of
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detention, the type of conditions of confinement to which inmates are exposed, and the outcomes
such segregation has on inmates’ mental and physical health. While inmates possess limited
liberty interests when segregated, such due process protections offer few reprieves from the
dreadful effects of solitary confinement and punitive administrative segregation exacted on
inmates housed in the nations prisons.
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